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LEGAL ORIGIN, JURIDICAL FORM AND
INDUSTRIALISATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE:
THE CASE OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT AND
THE JOINT-STOCK COMPANY
Simon Deakin*

I. INTRODUCTION
A central claim of contemporary economic theory is that institutions,
understood as rules, practices and routines of varying degrees of formality
and embeddedness, matter to economic performance (North, 1990; Aoki,
2001). A branch of new institutional economics, the legal origin
hypothesis, suggests that legal rules affect economic growth according to
how far they support the formation of markets and the protection of
property rights, particularly in the context of the rules governing the
business enterprise (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002). The content of legal
rules is in part a function, it is argued, of the infrastructure of the legal
system, including the way that disputes are resolved, the relationship
between the courts and the legislature, and the capacity of legal rules for
adaptation. The nature of this legal infrastructure varies across national
systems, with a principal point of difference being the divide between the
*
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common law and civil law legal families (Djankov et al., 2003a). It is
claimed that thanks to deep rooted path dependencies, systems which have
a common law origin enjoy a comparative advantage over their civil law
counterparts, at least in a period, such as the present, when growth is
linked to processes of market liberalization to which common law
institutions are, seemingly, well suited (La Porta et al., 2007) Empirical
support for this claim derives from the analysis of indices which measure
differences in the content of legal norms at cross-national level. Once
legal variation is quantified in this way, it becomes possible to examine
links between legal norms and economic performance. Common law
systems, on the whole, appear to have superior economic growth, at least
in relation to French-origin systems (Mahoney, 2001; La Porta et al.,
2007).
The legal origin hypothesis is one of the most significant ideas to have
emerged in the social sciences in the past decade and it is also one of the
most influential. The Doing Business reports of the World Bank, which
incorporate the legal origin approach and methodology, rank countries
according to how well their legal environment supports enterprise (World
Bank, various years). The rankings, it is said, have ‘encouraged regulatory
reforms in dozens of countries’ (La Porta et al., 2007, p. 325). The current
prominence of the legal origin claim has not, however, settled the debate
over its validity. On the contrary: both the theory underlying the claim,
and the empirical methods used to support it, are contentious. In this
paper, one particular aspect of the claim will be examined, namely the
existence of a link between long-run trends in the legal-institutional
framework and economic development.
It has been said, perhaps with only a little exaggeration, that the British
industrial revolution is ‘the centrepiece of world history over recent
centuries, and a fortiori of the country in which it began’ (Wrigley, 1988,
p. 8). As such it seems an appropriate case for an examination of the legal
origin hypothesis. Among the relevant questions are: what do we know of
the relationship between legal change and industrialization in Britain?
How does that process compare to changes going on in other systems in
Europe at the same time? What is the legacy of the institutional
developments which took root at this point and how far have they
influenced the subsequent trajectory of both the ‘parent systems’ – that is,
those in which the distinctive legal infrastructures of the common law and
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civil law first originated – and the ‘transplant systems’ – those to which
these infrastructures were diffused or upon which they were imposed by
conquest or colonization?
These are big questions, but questions, nevertheless, which the legal origin
hypothesis poses in a particularly sharp way, and to which it is necessary
to respond if that hypothesis is to be effectively evaluated. A start will be
made in that process here by looking at some of the available evidence on
the evolution of two of the basic legal forms of modern industrial
economies: the contract of employment and the joint stock company.
When did these forms emerge and what is the relationship of their
evolution to the nature of industrialization in different countries? It will
be argued that significant inter-country differences in the path of industrial
development in parent systems were reflected in variations in these legal
forms. When they were diffused through legal transplantation, they
carried with them distinctive approaches to the governance of the firm.
However, the differences in question do not map on the supposed divide
between a ‘market-orientated’ common law and a ‘regulation-orientated’
civil law. Divergence had more fundamental causes: principally,
differences in the timing of industrialization in relation to institutional
change. Essentially, industrialization preceded legal change in Britain,
whereas this relationship was reversed in France and Germany. In these
systems, the institutional revolution which came about with the adoption
of the first private law codes occurred several decades in advance of
comparatively late industrialisation. This differential ‘sequencing’ of legal
and economic change is a more powerful explanatory variable than
common law or civil law legal origin as such; although since legal systems
reflect and to some degree perpetuate differences in the structure of the
business enterprise across national systems, legal infrastructure is one
among a number of factors contributing to the ‘varieties of capitalism’
today.
Section 2 below sets out the basic claims of the legal origin school and
summarises the main lines of the debates concerning their theoretical and
empirical validity. Section 3 overviews evidence on how legal innovation
in ‘parent systems’ (Britain, France and Germany) was linked to the
process of industrialization and considers evidence on the transplantation
of norms. Section 4 assesses the legacy of legal origin on contemporary
labour and company law. Section 5 concludes.
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II. LEGAL FORM, ECONOMIC FUNCTION AND CROSSNATIONAL VARIATION IN THE LAW OF THE BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE
According to the Coasean tradition within new institutional economics, the
identifying feature of the firm is that the price mechanism is displaced by
centralized coordination by a manager or entrepreneur; likewise, ‘it is the
fact of direction which is the essence of the legal concept of “employer”
and “employee”, an observation which leads Coase to conclude that his
economic model ‘is one which closely approximates the firm as it is
considered in the real world’ (1988, p. 54). In the same vein, Hansmann
and Kraakman (2004, p. 2) claim that the concepts associated with the
company limited by share capital, including limited liability for
shareholders and separate corporate personality, are ‘induced by the
economic exigencies of the large modern business enterprise’, so that
‘corporate law everywhere must, of necessity, provide for them’. The
implication is that the employment contract and the corporation are
universally functional forms which are to be found wherever the business
enterprise exists. They were called into being by the emergence of the
modern firm and they now underpin its operation by minimizing the
transaction costs of production and exchange within that particular setting.
The legal origin approach does not contradict the idea that legal rules have
some degree of functionality with regard to the economy. Indeed, ‘law
matters’, or is said to matter, to economic growth in various ways. One of
the most important is the extent to which the law protects the interests of
shareholders against expropriation by management in the context of the
joint stock company. A regime of effective investor protection is said to
be one in which firms can more readily raise external finance (La Porta et
al., 1998). The growth of private credit in systems is said, likewise, to be
enhanced by laws which protect creditor interests in the event of the firm’s
insolvency (Djankov et al., 2007). In so far as the external financing of
firms, through the capital markets or through the credit system, is
understood to be a factor in promoting economic development, legal
protection for shareholders and creditors can be said to promote growth
(Levine, 2007). In the case of both equity-based and debt-based financing,
the law serves to reduce agency and other transaction costs associated with
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the financing of the firm, enables investors to diversify their risk, and
more generally contributes to liquidity within financial markets
(Easterbrook and Fischel, 1990). Labour regulation, on the other hand, is
seen as largely driven by non-efficiency considerations, and through its
encouragement to rent-seeking, has the potential to depress growth
(Botero et al., 2004). It is assumed here that the basic economic model of
the employment contract, in which powers of direction are reserved to the
employer and a competitive labour market ensures an equilibrium between
supply and demand, is an efficient one, which regulatory intervention will
mostly likely undermine.
Where the legal origin approach departs from prior accounts of the role of
the law is in pointing to significant cross-national differences which, it is
argued, are reflected in economic outcomes. It is a striking feature of the
legal origin literature, sometimes called in this context the ‘new
comparative economics’ (Djankov et al., 2003a), that significant variations
across national regimes have been found in all the areas of law which have
been examined using this methodology, and that these differences map on
to the divide between common law and civil law legal families. The first
finding of the legal origin school and perhaps still the most influential was
to the effect that systems of common law origin provide higher levels of
investor protection than those of the civil law (La Porta et al., 1998). The
study supporting this claim was based on the construction of an ‘antidirector rights index’ which measured shareholder protection according to
six variables: ‘proxy by mail allowed’, ‘shares not blocked before the
meeting’, ‘cumulative voting’, ‘oppressed minorities mechanism’, ‘preemptive rights to new issues’, and ‘share capital required to call an
extraordinary shareholder meeting’. To these were added a number of
other relevant variables including ‘one share one vote’ and ‘mandatory
dividend’. A ‘creditor rights index’ was also developed in this paper,
based on the variables ‘restrictions for going into reorganisation’, ‘no
automatic stay on secured assets’, ‘secured creditors first’ and
‘management does not stay’. In most cases, the laws of the countries
concerned (49 in this particular study) were coded using binary values,
with ‘1’ indicating protection and ‘0’ no protection. The legal rules
examined were those in force in the mid-1990s. When the results were
regressed against a number of legal and economic indicators, it was found
that common law systems (essentially those of the USA and Britain and its
former colonies) provided significantly higher levels of shareholder and
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creditor protection than civilian ones. French civil law systems (the
systems of France, the low countries, Spain, Italy, Latin America and parts
of Africa and east Asia) scored the lowest, with German origin systems
(most countries in central and eastern Europe, some former German
colonies, and most of east Asia including Japan, Korea, China and
Taiwan) and Nordic systems in the middle. Low levels of shareholder
protection were associated with high levels of concentration of share
ownership in large publicly listed companies, in particular in Frenchorigin systems. Thus differences across legal systems really did matter:
‘legal systems matter to corporate governance and … firms have to adapt
to the limitations of the legal systems that they operate in’ (La Porta et al.,
1998, p. 1117).
The codings in the early legal origin papers were criticized for their
inaccuracy (some of the judgements made behind the ascription of
particular scores to variables were open into question: Cools, 2005;
Braendle, 2006; Spamann, 2006), inconsistency (by attributing equal
weight to the individual variables the index introduced implicit weightings
which had not been clearly justified: Aherling and Deakin, 2007), and
selection bias (the variables chosen reflected certain features of developed
economies, in particular that of the USA, which were not universally
relevant: Siems, 2005). When the original ‘law and finance’ index was
reconstructed using more a more consistent approach to coding, many of
the original results disappeared (Spamann, 2005). These criticisms
prompted legal origin theorists to develop a number of alternative
approaches to the quantification of legal rules, the analysis of which
restored their core results. Thus a ‘self-dealing index’ which relied upon
responses from law firms to a question about how the law would be
applied to a case of a conflict of interest on the part of a director or senior
manager, reproduced the finding that common law systems were most
protective of shareholder rights (Djankov et al., 2008). Studies extending
the original creditor rights index confirmed the view that strong protection
for creditors in insolvency law and the law of secured transactions
increased levels of private credit in economies (Djankov et al., 2006,
2007).
The labour regulation index, which appeared in the early 2000s, contained
over one hundred variables, divided into three main areas: employment
law, industrial relations law, and social security law (Botero et al., 2004).
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These three sub-indices were further divided; in the case of the
employment law sub-index the relevant variables were‘[availability of]
alternative employment contracts’, ‘cost of increasing hours worked’,
‘costs of firing workers’ and ‘dismissal procedures’. Each of these
composite variables contained several individual indicators. Again,
analysis demonstrated cross-national variation by reference to the origin of
legal systems: the intensity of labour regulation was greater in civil law
systems, with the French-origin systems displaying the highest scores.
Higher levels of regulation were found to correlate with lower male labour
force participation, higher youth unemployment, and a larger informal
economy. Thus the authors concluded against the view that labour
regulation could be explained on efficiency grounds: ‘legal origins shape
regulatory styles, and… such dependence has adverse consequences for at
least some measures of efficiency’ (Botero et al., 2004, p. 1378).
These findings, based as they were on a novel empirical approach to
analyzing the impact of legal rules, were nevertheless in need of a
theoretical explanation. Two complementary ones were provided (Beck et
al., 2003). According to the first of these, legal infrastructure influences
the content of legal norms, and thereby economic outcomes, via an
‘adaptability channel’. The common law is founded on judge-made rules
which emerge from the mass of individual legal precedents in a case-law
based system. As such, common law rules form a kind of emergent or
spontaneous order which responds to shifts in economic conditions over
time. This idea is a development of a claim previously made in the
economic analysis of law, to the effect that the common law evolves in a
way which selects against inefficient rules. Rules which destroy private
wealth are more likely to be litigated against than those which support
wealth-creation. In this way, the system contains an inherent disposition
to discard market-unfriendly rules, or to adapt them in favour of marketfriendly ones (Priest, 1977). The civil law, which does not recognize
judicial decisions as precedents to the same degree as the common law,
and which views legal codes as primary sources of law, has no such
mechanism (or so it is said). The second explanation is based on public
choice theory and posits the existence of a ‘political channel’. Common
law systems, because of their support for judicial independence and the
power of the courts to control the exercise of executive power, provide
fewer opportunities for rent-seeking than systems of the civil law which
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look to legislation and codification to provide legal solutions, and thereby
avoid disruptive distributional conflicts.
These perspectives found support in the further development of the
empirical branch of the legal origins literature. A ‘legal formalism index’
was developed which focused on differences in court procedure across
systems (Djankov et al., 2003b). The information on which the index was
based was drawn from questionnaires sent to international law firms.
They were asked to assess how long it would take to enforce two types of
basic legal claim: recovering on a bounced cheque, and evicting a tenant
who owed rent. The expense and time devoted to pursuing these claims
was found to be significantly greater in French civil law systems than in
those of the other legal families. This was taken as confirmation of the
idea that the civil law (above all in its French-origin variant) was less
amenable to the enforcement of basic property and contract rights than the
common law.
Notwithstanding this apparent empirical validation, there are problems
with the suggested ‘channels’ linking legal infrastructure to substantives
rules and then to economic outcomes. The idea of legal families is an
abstraction which glosses over the empirical detail of legal systems;
because of the interchanges between systems which have taken place over
time, and their many common conceptual reference points, most national
regimes have a ‘mixed’ or ‘hybrid’ aspect to them (Siems, 2005). If the
notion of families of systems is not entirely artificial, modern comparative
law studies nevertheless take the view that the association of the common
law systems with judge-made law, and the civil law systems with
regulation, masks a more layered reality (Mattei, 1997; Markesinis, 2003;
Glenn, 2007). As we shall see in more detail in section 3 below, within
common law systems, many of the rules relating to the business enterprise
and to the employment relationship are statutory in origin. Legislation
was needed to introduce the institutions of limited liability of shareholders
and separate corporate personality in both Britain; the common law (in the
sense of the judge-made rules of private law) resisted both ideas (Harris,
2000). Similarly, the law governing the employment relationship in
Britain during the industrial revolution was a mixture of statute (masterservant legislation) and the common law of contract; the role of legislation
was significant at all stages (Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005). Today, the
scale and complexity of both labour and company legislation in the UK is
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such that commentators have observed that its excessive length makes it
cumbersome and rigid by comparison to the civil law approach of
continental European systems (Davies, 1997, p. 8). When we turn to the
civil law, we find, conversely, that alongside what is clearly a considerable
body of legislation governing commercial and private law relationships,
there is has long been a prominent role for the courts in legal innovation
(Pistor, 2005). It was judges interpreting the civil code in an unexpected
way who, for example, developed the concept of good faith in commercial
contracts in Germany (see Teubner, 2001). The private law codes of the
civilian world, far from being rigid and monolithic statutes, are (at least in
their nineteenth century core) restatements of principle, which have been
open to reinterpretation by the courts, with the result that their meaning
has been substantially reshaped over time.
A closer look at legal systems, informed by comparative law theory,
therefore suggests that there is no reason to believe, a priori, that the basic
infrastructure of common law systems is inherently more adaptable, or less
prone to rent-seeking, than that of civil law systems. All systems are
hybrids in which legislation and case law both play a role in shaping the
content of legal rules. The question of how far they balance the tension
between continuity and flexibility in the formation of substantive rules,
and of to what extent they are vulnerable to self-seeking interest groups,
are empirical ones, which should be investigated by identifying specific
institutional mechanisms which might have these effects (Siems, 2006).
This is not the same thing as saying that the common law/civil law divide
is of no significance. Where modern comparative legal studies and the
‘new comparative economics’ find some common ground is in the concept
of ‘legal cultures’ which have the potential to shape approaches to
regulation. The idea of legal culture refers to ingrained practices operating
to a certain extent beyond the scope of formal norms, which inform
approaches to the making, interpretation and application of rules (Legrand,
1999). A relevant illustration of this in the present context is the tendency
of civil law regimes to place greater weight on mandatory rules of law in
the governance of business relationships, in contrast to a common law
view which gives priority to the parties’ agreement and sees compulsory
norms, whether deriving from statute or from the judge-made law, as
exceptional (Pistor, 2005; Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007). The civilian
view is the product of a certain way of conceptualizing the relationship
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between the legal system and private contract; contracts are made within a
framework set by the private law codes and as such are subject to certain
principles of the law which can have overriding effect. This orientation
has been interpreted by legal origin theorists as an anti-market view:
‘when the market system gets into trouble or into a crisis, the civil law
approach is to repress it or even to replace it with state mandates, while the
common law approach is to shore it up’ (La Porta et al., 2007, p. 308). A
different perspective is that the civilian approach does not ‘restrict’
markets as such, but rather sees a role for the legal system as constituting
the conditions under which market relations are formed. In viewing civil
law rules as an instance of external regulation of otherwise autonomous
contractual agreements, the legal origin hypothesis would then be in
danger of according universal validity to what is, in essence, a perspective
specific to the common law (Deakin, 2006).
Be that as it may be, now that legal origin theorists have accepted the
relevance of legal culture to their work (La Porta et al., 2007, p. 311),
there is the opportunity for a deeper empirical investigation of this
phenomenon and its role as a source of cross-national diversity. However,
there is a need to move beyond the methods so far relied on to provide
empirical support for the legal origin claim. The main drawback of the
existing studies is that they rely on cross-sectional data on the state of the
law, in a period, sometimes quite loosely defined, from the mid-1990s to
the early 2000s. Several studies have queried the assumption of a timeinvariant legal origin effect. It is hard to make out a consistent and
continuous influence of legal origin given the ‘great reversals’ in the
development of stock markets which have taken place in the course of the
twentieth century (Rajan and Zingales, 2003); the external shocks of
depression and war have been powerful influences on financial
development (Roe, 2003, 2006).
The claim that common law systems enjoy higher levels of GDP growth
than civil law systems (Mahoney, 2001), or at least the French-origin ones
(and even here the effect is weak once certain controls are taken into
account: La Porta et al., 2007) is also affected by the issue of time
invariance. The result is sensitive to the period in question being studied
and to the choice of countries in the sample. Between the 1950s and the
late 1970s so-called ‘coordinated market’ systems, all of which are civilian
in origin, grew faster than ‘liberal market’ ones, all of which are common
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law in origin, if only developed countries are taken into account. The
picture is reversed for the period since the early 1980s (Hall and Soskice,
2001). None of this suggests, in itself, that legal origin was the cause of
the differential growth rates in either period; it does however imply that if
there is such an effect, it is not constant.
If the legal origin hypothesis were correct, we would expect to see stable
differences across national systems over time, and these differences being
reflected in differences in GDP growth. Until recently no systematic
evidence was available on this question, but now that systematic
longitudinal data are available, it is clear that even going back only a few
decades, the laws governing the enterprise have been subject to
considerable change within national systems, that the rank order of
countries has changed, and that the relative position of common law and
civil law groupings was not always as it seems to have been in the late
1990s (Siems, 2008; Lele and Siems, 2007; Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007;
Armour et al., 2007, 2008; see further section 4, below). Perhaps the best
thing that can be said of the claim that legal origin is linked to GDP
growth is that it is yet to be clearly established, given the present limited
state of data on legal change.
It is not just longitudinal data on legal change that have, until very
recently, been lacking; a more general historical perspective on the issues
raised by legal origin theory is needed. It is time to consider what history
might be able to tell us about legal change and economic growth.

III. INDUSTRIALIZATION AND LEGAL CHANGE: THE
EMERGENCE OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT AND
THE JOINT-STOCK COMPANY

A. THE EXPERIENCE OF PARENT SYSTEMS
The bringing into being of modern systems of private and commercial law
was one of the great institutional revolutions of the nineteenth century, a
process which occurred alongside industrialization and the rise of the
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market economy. Labour relationships were not unaffected by this
process, but in their case the new priority accorded to property and
contract was qualified by a continuing role for status-based forms of
regulation. Moreover, contrary to what might be inferred from the legal
origin hypothesis, it was the civilian systems – both the systems of origin,
and their continental European neighbours – which moved most quickly
and decisively in the direction of liberalizing the law, at least at the level
of formal legal rules and concepts.
1. THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
In France, legislation of the revolutionary period brought about a
fundamental break with early modern economic institutions; guilds and their
equivalents were peremptorily ‘abolished’ by the décret d’Allarde and loi Le
Chapelier of 1791, with the latter also making workers’ combinations and
strikes illegal. The Civil Code of 1804 then classified the work relationship
as contractual in nature, placing it, moreover, in the category of the ‘law of
things’. This was done in order to give expression to the idea that the labour
contract, just like sale or lease, was a relationship of exchange between
juridical equals. All other continental codes subsequently followed this
pattern: labour, or in some versions labour power – as, for example, in the
German term Arbeitskraft – became a commodity, which was linked to the
market mechanism via contract (on the pre-marxian origins of the term
Arbeitskraft see Biernacki, 1995, and on its legal significance, see Simitis,
2000).
By contrast, Blackstone’s canonical treatment, in the mid-eighteenth century,
of the relation of ‘master and servant’ in English law, had placed it firmly in
the ‘law of persons’. Blackstone’s analysis was, it has been suggested,
anachronistic even for its time (Kahn-Freund, 1978), but this view overstates
the degree to which contractual concepts were being used to describe work
relations in the period of the industrial revolution. Legislation underpinning
the rights and privileges of the guilds in England, which had been in decline
since the early eighteenth century, was repealed in 1813, and wage-fixing
powers were removed in 1814; but master-servant legislation, which
criminalized breach of the service contract and gave the magistrates powers
to imprison workers for, among other things, acts of disobedience and
quitting before the end of the agreed term, was retained long after that. The
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sanction of imprisonment was removed in the 1860s before the masterservant laws were completely repealed only in 1875. Even after this point,
local magistrates retained a quasi-penal jurisdiction to order damages which
were in the nature of fines against workers found to have acted in breach of
contract. Thus for most of the nineteenth century, work relations in the case
of manual industrial and agricultural trades (clerical, managerial and
professional workers were outside the master-servant laws) were governed
by a legal regime which was only partially contractual; legislation specific to
master-servant relationship supported a hierarchical conception of
managerial control, backed up by the criminal law, the application of which
depended on the legal status of the worker (see Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005:
ch. 2).
By contrast, the French Civil Code was consciously drafted in an attempt to
escape from what were seen as pre-modern notions of status. The 1804
Code adopted two models of the labour contract. One, the louage d’ouvrage
or hire of work, was modelled on the Roman law concept of the locatio
conductio operis, which referred to a contract for a finished job of work or
completed task. The second, the louage de services, bore a resemblance to
the Roman law locatio conductio operarum, or hire of services. However,
these terms were adaptations which were ‘the same as the old locatio
conductio in name only’ (Veneziani, 1986, p. 32). The Roman law locatio
was viewed as a form implying the subordination of the worker, a concept
regarded as incompatible with liberal contractual ideas. Even in the case of
the louage de services, the form which superficially bore the closest
resemblance to an open-ended agreement to serve, services could only be
provided for a certain purpose or for a limited period of time.
The concept of the worker’s subordination to the employer did not, however,
disappear from the law (see Veneziani, 1986). The French Civil Code itself
retained the rule which stipulated that, in the event of a dispute over wages
between employer and worker, only the word of the employer was to be
believed. This provision found its way into the other continental codes and
stayed there for the remainder of the nineteenth century. Continental
systems also preserved and in certain respects strengthened the punitive, premodern system of the workbook or livret. In the same way as master-servant
laws, this gave state authorities powers to regulate labour mobility and
punish breaches of discipline through the use of criminal sanctions. The
distinction between the louage d’ouvrage and the louage de services should
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be understood in this context. Workers in both categories might come under
the regulatory jurisdiction associated with the livret, which, just before the
adoption of the Civil Code, was strengthened by legislation (the law of 12
germinal An 11 (12 April 1803)). Thus the emerging forms of wage labour,
rather than being confined to the superficially employment-like louage de
services, were to be found in both categories, and in each case were subject
to disciplinary legal control (Petit and Sauze, 2006).
The German Civil Code, the BGB, adopted in 1896, adopted a superficially
similar terminology to that of its French predecessor. The BGB formally
distinguished between the Dienstvertrag, literally the ‘contract for service’,
and the Werkvertrag, the contract for work or sub-contract. However, the
BGB marked a break of a different kind with the Roman law model of the
location; the Dienstvertrag was placed in and aligned to the law of persons,
while the Werkvertrag was viewed more straightforwardly as a commercial
relationship. The Dienstvertrag came to embody the idea of the employer’s
duty of care (Fürsorgepflicht), as a counterpart to the duty of loyalty
(Treuepflicht) owed by the worker. This was a reflection of a view among
certain jurists, led by Gierke, who argued that the BGB should reflect
communitarian principles which, they argued, were present in juridical forms
of the work relationship which preceded the codification process (Veneziani,
1986, p. 59; Supiot, 1994, p. 18; Sims, 2002, pp. 85-86).
None of the legal forms so far discussed completely resembles the modern
contract of employment. This concept has, today, several distinct features
(Davidov, 2006). Firstly, it embraces as a category all or almost all wagedependent or salary-dependent workers, thereby overcoming old distinctions
between white-collar and blue-collar workers, managerial and industrial
workers, and so on. Secondly, it is distinguished from self-employment or,
as it known in common law jurisdictions, the ‘contract for services’
(although with increasing uncertainly about its application to so-called
flexible or marginal forms of employment such as casual work, agency work
and labour only sub-contracting). Thirdly, it gives rise to a set of mutual
obligations, involving a duty of obedience and cooperation on the part of the
employee and a duty of care on the part of the employer. The precise scope
of these obligations varies from one context to another and, in different
jurisdictions, the degree to which they are regarded as open to renegotiation
by the parties also differs; however, most systems agree that if these
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obligations are altogether lacking from a given work relationship, it will not
be regarded as one of employment.
This is the model described by Coase (1988) as referring to the ‘reality’ of
employment and which he cited in support of his economic theory of the
firm. At the time ‘The Nature of the Firm’ was written (the mid-1930s) it
was both a recognizable legal model and one which corresponded well to
predominant types of industrial organization. However, it was not a form
which came straightforwardly into existence either at the point when
industrial production began to be widespread, nor when the civil codes
displaced pre-modern juridical categories. For most of the nineteenth
century, work relations in industrializing countries were described by a
multiplicity of legal forms, some referring to specific work categories within
or beyond the category of wage labour, and in which elements of status and
contract were intermingled. Different elements of these legal types
eventually coalesced to form what became the ‘contract of employment’, but
they did so in ways which reflected distinct legal traditions and different
economic conditions across national systems.
The term contrat de travail (the equivalent of ‘contract of employment’) first
began to be used in France in the 1880s, and as such was distinct from the
versions of the locatio which had appeared in the Civil Code of 1804
(Cottereau, 2000). Its adoption was triggered, firstly, by the view of certain
employers that a general duty of obedience should be read into all industrial
hirings. The pre-existing legal forms, with their emphasis on the contractual
equality of the parties, were seen as giving insufficient legal support to
managerial authority within the firm. At the same time, the new concept
proved to be useful for determining the scope of industrial accidents
legislation which was being adopted in that period, and it was adopted by
commissions of jurists who were charged with developing a conceptual
framework for the emerging law of collective bargaining and worker
protection (Veneziani, 1986; Didry, 2002). This was also the point at which
legislation on the livret was modified so that the punitive elements of the
jurisdiction fell away, leaving an obligation on the part of the employer
simply to record the express terms of the contract. The essence of the new
model was an adaptation of the notion of ‘subordination’: an open-ended
duty of obedience was read into all employment relationships, in return for
the absorption by the enterprise and, via social security, the state, of social
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risks, beginning with health and safety and later extending to income and job
security.
Legal developments in several countries around the turn of the twentieth
century illustrate the growing influence of this model. The concept appears
in a Belgian law of 1900, the Dutch law of the employment contract of 1907,
in an Italian draft statute of 1902 and laws of 1907 and 1924, in the French
Code du travail of 1910, in the revisions to the German code of 1913 and
1919, and in the report of a Danish commission of 1910 and a law of 1921
(Veneziani, 1986, p. 68). The logic of these innovations was not the same in
every case, even if they shared an underlying continuity. In particular, there
were divergences between French-origin and German-origin systems. In
systems coming under French influence, the law assumed that the state
had the power to regulate basic conditions of work. The idea of ordre
public social signified a set of mandatory conditions written into the
employment relationship. The law, in recognizing the employer’s
unilateral powers of direction and control within the organisational
structure of the enterprise, also undertook the responsibility for protecting
the individual worker; the employee was thereby placed in a position of
‘juridical subordination’. In systems influenced by the German code, the
contractual character of the employment relationship was qualified by a
‘communitarian’ conception of the enterprise. The German law concept of
the ‘personal subordination’ of the worker implied their ‘factual adhesion
to the enterprise’ (‘Tatbestand’), a process conferring upon the individual
‘a status equivalent to membership of a community’ (Supiot, 1994, p. 18).
The British experience was different. The abolition of legislative support
for the guilds was viewed as a necessary step in the formation of a market for
labour. However, it did not lead to the adoption by the courts of the contract
of employment as the paradigm legal form of the work relationship. If there
was a ‘contract of employment’ in the mid-nineteenth century, it described
the situation of occupational groups, such as managers, lawyers and clerks,
with a high-level status or professional background, a stable relationship
with their employer, and a degree of protection against interruptions to
income by virtue of sickness on the one hand and temporary fluctuations in
demand on the other. By contrast, manual workers in both industry and
agriculture, a category which included skilled artisans, were still covered by
the Master and Servant Acts. It took the repeal of that legislation for the
conceptual shift to the employment contract to begin, although the same
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status-based distinctions were carried over into early workmen’s
compensation and social insurance legislation (Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005,
ch. 2).
In modern British labour law, the category of the contract of employment
has expanded to cover almost all wage-dependent workers, with the
category of the ‘contract for services’ describing independent contractors
and the self-employed. However, this ‘binary divide’ entered British
labour law at a late stage, in the 1950s and 1960s. (Freedland, 2003, chs. 1
and 2). The post-1945 welfare state saw the completion of a system of
state-run social insurance which was intended to be ‘comprehensive’ in
the sense of protecting against a wide-range of work-related risks, and the
introduction of employment protection legislation stabilising the
individual work relationship; in was in the context of this legislation that
the courts began to apply the model of the contract of employment as a
unitary category covering all forms of wage-dependent labour. The labour
law model of the contract of employment was borrowed from concepts
which had developed in fiscal law and social security law in the inter-war
period (Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005, ch. 2).
Thus the British case is one in which the employment model emerged at a
late stage in the process of legal development accompanying
industrialisation, and even then was only weakly institutionalized. The
French and German experiences illustrate different trajectories within
which there was a more explicit recognition of the role of the contract of
employment as a mechanism of integration within the enterprise and of
social cohesion beyond it. The result was, viewed historically, a more
complete institutionalization of the employment model at the juridical
level.
A similar divergence between the British and continental experiences can
be observed in company law. Britain’s early industrialization came at a
point when the legal institutions which later came to underpin the
industrial enterprise were still in the process of formation. Not only was
there no unitary model of the contract of employment at this point; limited
liability was not generally available and few manufacturing firms were
legally incorporated. Joint stock existed in the case of the trading
companies incorporated by royal charter, and a form of separate corporate
personality was available to banks and utilities such as railway and canal
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companies. However, joint stock did not always imply limited liability.
In the same way that the attributes of the employment contract emerged
independently of each other, in different contexts and at different times,
features of the corporate form which today make up a unified legal
structure originated in a range of different organisational contexts (Harris,
2000). Even when a general incorporation procedure for joint stock
companies was introduced by statute in 1844, followed by limited liability
for shareholders in legislation of 1855-6, manufacturing firms were slow
to take it up. Most of them remained sole proprietorships or partnerships
until the late nineteenth century and only adopted corporate form when a
merger wave began in the 1890s (Hannah, 1974)

2 THE JOINT-STOCK COMPANY
Company law and the law of the work relationship displayed
complementary features which matched the predominant type of industrial
enterprise in particular countries. Integrated managerial structures were
slow to develop in most British manufacturing firms in the nineteenth
century. In their place, employers relied on the disciplinary power of the
master-servant regime and its post-1875 successors as a mechanism of
labour control. As master-servant law faded, they made use of the
‘internal contracting’ system, which persisted well into the final decades
of the nineteenth century and in some cases the early parts of the
twentieth, to delegate the managerial function and devolve risk on to
labour-only subcontractors and other intermediaries (Littler, 1982;
Holbrook-Jones, 1982). Thus the slow development of the employment
contract in British labour law matched a tendency for industrial enterprises
to be vertically disintegrated and slow to develop a managerial
specialization (Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005, ch. 2). How far this was also
a function of them being weakly capitalized is less clear, but where
integrated organizational structures and stable, long-term employment
were in evidence, it was in sectors such as the railways and utilities which
were among the first to make use of the corporate form (they had this
option from an early point, subject to legislative approval of the purposes
of the company) and obtained access to external finance through a broad
shareholder base (Kostal, 1994).
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By contrast, in the continental systems at the start of the twentieth century
‘it… became common knowledge that major industrial concentration
required a form of employment which had to be subordinate (i.e.
completely subject to the power of the employer) in order to favour the
accumulation of capital’ (Veneziani, 1986, p. 71). The continent’s late
industrialisation occurred after the decisive break occasioned by the codes
had put in motion the process of legal adjustment to the emerging
industrial order, and at a point when mature legal institutions for
describing the business enterprise had already developed. The concept of
the company limited by share capital, uniting the principles of limited
liability, separate personality and centralized management, was already in
place in Germany and France by the 1870s. The company laws of the
continent followed the English example set in 1855-6, with some
adaptations. There was a clearer distinction between forms suitable for the
large enterprise in need of substantial external capital (the Société
Anonyme and Aktiengesellschaft) and those designed for smaller ownermanager or family-run enterprises (the SARL and GmbH). Most of the
emerging industrial enterprises in the final decades of the nineteeth
century used one form or the other (even founder and family-dominated
firms such as Krupp, which was incorporated only in 1903: see Hannah,
2007). Organisational integration and the development of a specialized
managerial function were a feature of the larger German and French firms
(see Kocka, 1980 and Lévy-Leboyer, 1980, respectively). Although they
were not the only focus of economic growth, and, indeed, were not typical
of the economy as a whole – they existed alongside a larger mass of small
and medium-sized enterprises and guild-type economic relations among
producers persisted (Herrigel, 1996) – the larger enterprises influenced the
development of a distinctive civil law legal model of the firm. By the
mid-twentieth century, legal concepts such as ‘entity theory’ and the
company’s interest ‘in itself’ stressed management’s duty to maintain the
organisational unity of the enterprise as a goal in its own right rather than,
as in the common law, a means to the end of returning value to
shareholders. Codetermination, which found its strongest expression in
the German-influenced systems but also evolved in a somewhat different
form in some of the French-origin ones, gave a formal voice to employees
and other constituencies within the process of corporate governance in a
way which had no equivalent in Britain or in other common law regimes
(Pistor, 1999).
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The idea that, by virtue of the contract of employment or employment
relationship, the worker was necessarily integrated into the organisational
structure of the enterprise, was ‘corrupted when it came into contact with a
different cultural and political régime: the connection between “work” and
“enterprise” was used by the Fascist dictatorships in order to strengthen
the principle of authority’ (Veneziani, 1986, p. 66), notable examples
included the Nazi labour ordinances of 1934, the Vichy labour charter of
1941 and parts of the Italian Civil Code of 1942. It was in reaction to this
process that in the immediate post-war period, the concept of the
employee’s subordination was realigned, with the adoption of social rights
at a constitutional and statutory level (in France and Italy) and the legal
institutionalization of codetermination (Germany). In Britain, the labour
movement did not push for similar legal recognition of worker interests,
preferring to rely on tradition of voluntary collective bargaining; the law
protected the autonomy of the industrial relations system but, wartime
aside, did not regulate it. British ‘voluntarism’ thereby minimized the role
of law, at least at the level of collective labour relations, and further
accentuated Britain’s exceptionalism within the European context.
3. THE ROLE OF LEGAL ORIGIN IN EXPLAINING THE DIVERSITY OF MARKET
SYSTEMS

Thus the ‘parent’ legal systems of western Europe responded to
industrialization, in so far as the law governing the business enterprise was
concerned, in distinctive ways, which reflected country-specific
conditions. This led to the diversity across national systems that can still
be observed today. In each case, private-law concepts of property and
contract had to be accommodated to an emerging industrial order. What
was the role of legal origin in this process? In particular, how far did the
method of codification, which favours the systematisation of legal rules
and gives a prominent role to mandatory norms as a technique of legal
control, lead to a substantively different kind of legal regime for
enterprise? It is possible that it did, but not in the way suggested by the
legal origin hypothesis. It is necessary, to begin with, to put aside the idea
that code-based systems are necessarily more inclined to statutory
solutions than common law ones. In all systems, both courts and
legislatures played a part in developing the law of the business enterprise
in the nineteenth century; indeed, there is case for saying that most of the
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innovations were statutory. The claim that the common law favoured
emergent or spontaneous solutions over the rational-constructivist ones of
the civilian codes is impossible to square with the repeated legislative
interventions which shaped both labour and company law and which were
inevitably influenced by interest-group activity (during a period when
most industrial and agricultural workers had no access to the suffrage).
Nor was it the case that the common law produced legal solutions which
were more market-orientated than those of the civil law. If anything, the
reverse is true: private law concepts were more quickly adopted in the
civilian systems thanks to the systematizing effects of the codes and the
decisive break they brought about with prior legal structures. Britain was
not only slow to discard its pre-modern master and servant legislation and
late to adopt the model of the contract of employment by comparison with
the continent; when it enacted companies legislation embodying the basic
elements of the modern corporate form, its manufacturing enterprises were
slow to take it up, in contrast to the widespread use of the same model in
civilian systems.
In parent systems, the juridical concepts which were at the core of labour
and company law could be said to have been broadly complementary to
the particular kinds of work relations and corporate structures which
emerged in the different national systems. It is difficult to identify an
exogenous role for the legal system in a context where legal norms and
economic institutions essentially coevolved. However, it could be said
that the experience of parent systems, and of developed countries more
generally, does not provide a good test of the legal origin claim; a better
test is the case of systems whose laws and legal infrastructure were
imposed from outside through conquest or colonization, or adapted as part
of a process of late-stage industrialisation. Is it possible to identify an
exogenous effect of legal origin in their case?

B. THE DIFFUSION OF LEGAL NORMS IN ‘TRANSPLANT’ SYSTEMS
In the legal origin literature, the claim that legal infrastructure has an
independent influence on the development of substantive rules is
supported by the cross-sectional regressions which follow the model of the
first ‘law and finance’ paper (La Porta et al., 1998). There have been few
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studies looking in detail at the process of legal diffusion and attempting to
chart the mechanisms by which it occurred in particular country cases.
Where this has been done, evidence has been found of a distinctive type of
legal evolution in ‘transplant systems’. Pistor et al. (2003), studying the
development of corporate law in a number of developed and developing
economies, found that legal rules in systems of origin had changed to a
substantially greater extent than those in transplant systems. The latter
displayed two types of response: in some cases erratic changes, often
involving the reversal of previous policies; and in other cases, very little
change over long periods of time.
One possible interpretation of this result is that transplanted laws are not
subject to the same process of coevolutionary adaptation with national
economic conditions that can be observed in the case of parent systems.
However, more work is needed on this question, as there are many
mechanisms, in addition to the imposition of laws through colonization, by
which legal rules might be diffused.
These include regulatory
competition, international standard-setting, and the borrowing and
adaptation of norms which comes from mutual observation across
systems. In principle it is possible to see that systems which share a
common legal heritage may, for that reason alone, be more inclined to
adjust their laws by reference to a model of a ‘parent’ system or from
other countries in the same family; this can occur through linguistic and
cultural links of various kinds or through the reduced transaction costs
associated with borrowing foreign laws which complement local ones.
But there is very little empirical evidence on this question to date.
In the context of work relations, one area of colonial diffusion which has
been intensively studied in recent years is the transmission of masterservant legislation to British colonies, a process which began as early as
the seventeenth century (in the case of certain American states and the
West Indies) and carried on into the twentieth century (in the case of some
African countries), well after the repeal of the original laws in Britain.
Over the course of the three hundred years or so, ‘almost 2000 statutes and
ordinances made their appearance in more than 100 colonies, developing a
colonial master and servant law that drew upon, elaborated, and often
subverted the metropolitan models’ (Hay and Craven, 2004, p. 10). The
ending of slavery in the Empire in the early nineteenth century and the
formal instantiation of freedom of contract was accompanied by the
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enactment of pass and police laws and vagrancy legislation. Systems of
plantation labour in the West Indies and Assam, and mine labour in South
Africa, were underpinned by the coercive powers which master-servant
law provided to employers. There was also a link to migration and racial
segregation. Legislation was passed in several colonies in the 1830s and
1840s for the purpose of regulating the waves of indentured labour
(millions of workers) moving around the Empire at that time. These laws
created new forms of status around racial and cultural categories.
Legislation of this type was being enacted in east Asia, the Carribean and
Africa into the middle decades of the twentieth century.
Whereas, in Britain, master-servant laws were used to stabilize the labour
supply, reduce the bargaining power of workers and shore up managerial
prerogative in the mainly small-scale manufacturing enterprises which
were characteristic of the industrial structure of the parent system, in the
colonies the same types of laws were used to assist in the dispossession
and separation from the land of indigenous populations and to maintain the
supply of cheap labour which was essential in plantation and mining-based
economies. Plantation systems simply were not profitable without
criminal enforcement of labour contracts; and the prosecution rates in
some plantation societies were fully fifty times as high as those in parts of
England, such as the west Midlands, where the master-servant laws were
most heavily relied on by employers (Simon, 1954). In late nineteenth
century Trinidad, around one fifth of all criminal convictions involved
breach of contract. Enforcement took the form not simply of fines and
imprisonment, but of judicially-supervised performance of the work
contract, and the addition of extra periods of service as compensation for
breaches by the worker (Turner, 2004).
The end of master-servant laws did not come about through economic
development. They lingered longest in systems without the democratic
suffrage and without recognition of basic labour rights. Britain’s own
experience had been similar: it was only as the franchise was extended that
the political conditions for the repeal of master-servant laws were
gradually established.
Across the Empire, notwithstanding some
liberalising moves from the Colonial Office which local employers often
resisted, it was the pressure of the International Labour Organisation in the
1920s and 1930s and then the decolonisation process itself which brought
about the abandonment of penal laws (Banton, 2004).
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The influence of the master-servant model is a good example of a legal
origin effect which occurs when transplantation is combined with
colonialisation to produce strong path dependencies. This case is,
however, further repudiation of the particular legal-origin claim that
common law systems were more inherently disposed to a liberal
contractual model of work relations than civil law ones. Master-servant
law was essentially status-based; that is to say, it preserved distinctions
based on class, in the British case, and race, in the colonies. This can be
seen from the evolution of the law in South Africa. The master-servant
laws there were facially neutral, but with the passage from the middle
decades of the twentieth century of industrial relations legislation
regulating the mainly (and later exclusively) white occupations, the
master-servant regime was applied the agricultural and domestic sectors
which were traditionally non-white (Le Roux, 2008). With prosecutions
of tens of thousands of workers each year in the 1950s, the master-servant
laws became ‘one of the cornerstones of a differential labour law regime’
(Chanock, 2004, p. 424).

IV. THE LEGACY OF LEGAL ORIGIN IN THE LAW
GOVERNING THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
How significant is legal origin today as a factor preserving the diversity of
national systems and resisting tendencies towards convergence? This is
not a question which can be answered on the basis of the initial legal
origin studies, confined as they are to the study of the laws of the late
1990s and early 2000s. However, a clearer picture on this issue is now
possible thanks to recently available longitudinal data based on codings of
the law relating to the business enterprise in a number of countries for the
period from the 1970s to the present day (see Lele and Siems, 2007,
Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007, Siems, 2008, Armour et al., 2007, 2008,
and Deakin and Sarkar, 2008 for a more complete account of these
datasets and a discussion of their methodological basis).
The countries for which longitudinal data relating to this period exist are
Britain, France, Germany, India and the USA. The sample of countries is
small but these are five important cases (three parent systems; the world’s
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largest economy; and its largest democracy). Studying a relatively small
number of important cases over a long period of time makes it possible to
examine trends in legal change in a way which is not possible in a crosssectional analysis based on a sample of several dozen countries, and to
make a more in-depth study of the laws in question, with sources for the
values more completely justified. The three areas of law studied are those
relating to shareholder protection, creditor protection and labour
regulation. In addition, an index of changes in shareholder protection law
has been constructed for 20 countries, covering the period 1995-2006.
The sample includes a range of developed, developing and transition
systems (Armour et al., 2007).
More complete accounts of findings from the analysis of these datasets
have been provided elsewhere (see the references set out above); here the
main lines of those results will be noted in so far as they throw light on the
influence of legal origin today. Figures 1, 2 and 3 illustrate the broad
trends in the shareholder protection, creditor protection and labour
regulation indices for the five systems in the 1970-2005 dataset. It can be
seen that they display very different patterns of change. The shareholder
protection index shows a degree of convergence, as each of the five
systems has increased its level of protection for shareholders, in particular
since the early 2000s. The change has occurred in relation to those rules
which protect minority shareholders against over-powerful boards, rather
than in those which protect minority shareholders against powerful
blockholders; as such, the trend identified here is one of general
convergence around a common law model associated with an increased
role for independent directors and the market for corporate control in
holding managers accountable (Lele and Siems, 2007). A second feature
of the trend indicated by the shareholder protection index is that there is no
clear distinction between common law and civil law systems. The two
civil law systems, France and Germany, score as highly as Britain for
much of the period, and more highly than the United States for parts of it.
The larger sample of countries, covering the period 1995-2005, throws
further light on what has been happening. Over this period, common law
systems had, on average, consistently higher scores on the shareholder
protection index, but civil law systems had, on average, a faster rate of
increase in the protections accorded shareholders. Again, the pattern is
one in which a model which originated in the common law systems has
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become a global template, around which all systems have recently been
converging. Civil law systems have been catching up with the common
law paradigm. This finding suggests that legal origin is not a significant
impediment to formal convergence (Armour et al., 2007).
This pattern of convergence is not, however, repeated for creditor
protection, which shows persistent diversity which is not related to legal
origin: Germany and the UK have the strongest systems of creditor
protection, France and America the weakest. The pattern for labour
regulation shows the clearest evidence of divergence based on legal origin:
scores are substantially higher in the French and German systems than in
Britain or the USA, although India, a common law system, comes closer to
the German score, overall, than to that of any other country.
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Figure 1: Trends in shareholder protection in five countries. Source:
Shareholder Protection Index (SPI) (Lele and Siems, 2007). The figures in
the vertical axis refer to scores based on the indicators in the SPI; the
maximum possible score is 60.
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Figure 2: Trends in creditor protection in five countries. Source: Creditor
Protection Index (CPI) (Armour, Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007). The
figures in the vertical axis refer to scores based on the indicators in the
CPI; the maximum possible score is 51.
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Figure 3: Trends in labour regulation in five countries. Source: Labour
Regulation Index (LRI) (Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007). The figures in
the vertical axis refer to scores based on the indicators in the LRI; the
maximum possible score is 40.
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One of the core findings of the legal origin literature has been to identify
an effect which was said to be constant across a range of different areas of
law: shareholder and creditor rights, court procedure, labour regulation,
among others. With longitudinal data available, this result disappears, at
least for the five countries for which long time-series data exist: there are
different results for shareholder rights (convergence), creditor protection
(diversity with no reference to legal origin) and labour regulation
(diversity with reference to legal origin). This implies that, at least for this
period and these countries, the legal origin effect is not particularly strong;
it can be outweighed, for example, by the powerful move towards
convergence in shareholder protection, possibly driven by the increase in
the global influence of institutional investors and the spread of corporate
governance codes as a model for shareholder rights, legitimizing greater
controls over managerial discretion (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004).
In the area of labour law, which comes closest to confirming the legal
origins claim, it is hard to identify precise legal family-specific influences.
There is very little evidence, for example, of the sharing of legal ideas in
the labour law field in the common law systems in the sample, or, indeed
of any shared experiences. In the period under consideration here, the US
law governing employment changed very little, whereas British labour law
underwent far-reaching changes which were linked to the political cycle.
The experience of the other common law system – India – was, following
de-colonisation in the 1940s, to reject the master-servant model inherited
from Britain, and to adopt labour laws which continue to align it today
with the level of worker protection enjoyed by a civilian regime such as
Germany (Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007).
Although there is little evidence of a trend towards convergence in labour
law to match that in company law, some examples can be found of
specific diffusion effects which suggest that whatever legal origin effect
might exist in the labour law area, it is not a rigid constraint on
harmonization. This is the case with the adoption in Britain of laws
affecting the choice of alternative employment contracts, the regulation of
working time, and employee representation, since the late 1990s. Britain
has come closer to French and German practice in this period because it
has adjusted to transnational labour standards contained in European
Union laws, its common-law origin notwithstanding (Deakin, Lele and
Siems, 2007).
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The existence of longitudinal measures of legal change also makes it
possible to say something about the economic impact of legal change. If
the legal origin hypothesis were correct, we would expect to see changes
in certain areas of law having substantial, long-run economic impacts. For
example, a core tenet of the legal origin approach is that changes to
shareholder protection law should be reflected in stock market
development. Fagernäs et al. (2007), using the shareholder protection
index for the period 1970-2005, conduct a time series analysis to see if
there is any relationship between the trend in legal change and stock
market development over time in France, Germany, the UK and the US,
using stock market turnover ratio as the dependent variable. No consistent
relationship is found; and for the UK and France, the analysis suggests that
there is (somewhat counter-intuitively) a negative relationship. Sarkar
(2007) finds no relationship between the trend in the shareholder
protection index for India and the stock market turnover ratio there.
Deakin and Sarkar (2008) report the findings of a time series analysis of
changes in the labour regulation index for France, Germany, the UK and
the USA, also for the period from the 1970s to the present day. After
controlling for growth in GDP, they find that the trend in working time
legislation is positively correlated with employment growth in France and
productivity growth in Germany, and that the trend in dismissal protection
is positively correlated with productivity in Germany. There is weak
evidence that changes in dismissal law in the United States led to a
reduction in the growth rate of employment but there was a countervailing
increase in productivity.
Finally, Armour et al. (2007) carry out a panel-data analysis for the 20country dataset which covers changes in shareholder protection the period
1995-2005. They find no statistically significant correlation between the
changes recorded in the dataset, which, as we have just seen, indicate a
generally converging trend around the essentials of the common law
approach to corporate governance and the market for corporate control,
and conventional measures of stock market development including stock
market capitalization as a percentage of GDP and the stock market
turnover ratio.
These are early results, which reflect work in progress on a larger project
of constructing reliable measures of legal change over time and assessing

30

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 NO. 07

their implications for our understanding of the relationship between law
and economic growth. They do, however, cast doubt on some aspects of
the legal origin hypothesis, not least the claim that the common law
approach to regulation is more likely to produce efficiency-enhancing
rules. Aside from pointing to the indeterminacy of the law (given the
absence of a clear correlation, either positive or negative, between legal
change and economic outcomes in some contexts), they suggest that there
is a certain degree of complementarity between the substance of legal rule
and the wider institutional framework governing labour and capital
markets. This is one implication, at least, of the finding that employment
protection laws are more likely to be efficiency-enhancing in a civil law
context (Deakin and Sarkar, 2008).

V. CONCLUSIONS
The legal origin hypothesis claims that the infrastructure of legal systems
– the procedures for adopting, interpreting and applying legal rules, the
constitutional relationship between courts and legislatures, and other less
formal aspects of legal ‘culture’ or ‘style’ – influences the substantive
content of the law in the area of norms governing the business enterprise
and, more generally, regulating market activity. Variations in legal
infrastructure which correspond to the distinction between common law
and civil law legal families are reflected, it is said, in distinct approaches
to the regulation of business, with the common law supporting the market
order and the civil law tending to control it. These legal variations are
linked, in turn, to differences in economic performance across systems.
The legal origin hypothesis has had a considerable influence on policy. It
has yet, however, to offer convincing theoretical or empirical bases for the
claims it is making. The ‘channels’ through which legal origin is said to
work are based on over-stylized descriptions of the common law/civil law
divide, while the results it has generated rest on limited data, which
capture, at best, differences across legal systems at a particular point in
time in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and which even then have been
subject to some searching methodological critiques.
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In this paper an attempt has been made to analyse the legal origin claim
using historical evidence on the long-run development of labour and
company law and new panel data on their more recent evolution, since the
1970s in a small but not unimportant sample of countries. The historical
evidence highlights the divergent paths taken by parent systems since
industrialization. There is a common law/civil law divide, but it reflects
the early industrialization of the British case, in which economic change
preceded legal and institutional reforms, and the later industrialization of
France and Germany, which occurred after the codification of private law.
The picture is not one of a more market-friendly common law contrasting
with regulation in the civil law. Many complex elements were involved in
the emergence of modern labour law and company law concepts; in all
systems there was a mix of liberal contractual ideas and punitive
regulatory legislation for much of the nineteenth century. Over time the
civil law adjusted itself to a model of the firm which accommodated
worker voice and an element of social protection in the workplace in
return for the integration of the employee into the organisational structure
of the enterprise. In the common law, the separation of worker interests
from the firm was reflected in a weakly-institutionalised notion of the
contract of employment. In this respect, British experience reflected the
lingering influence of the pre-modern master-servant regime, which was
transplanted to other common law systems via colonialisation. The
master-servant model ended only with the first moves to universal
suffrage, in Britain, and decolonisation, elsewhere.
The experience of industrialization is reflected in the approaches taken by
different legal systems to the regulation of the business enterprise. Legal
cultures are a potential source of enduring cross-national variation, since
they perpetuate institutional solutions to issues of market regulation, often
after their initial purpose has been exhausted. However, this does not
mean that legal solutions are predetermined by the legacy of legal origin,
let alone that such solutions divide neatly, in terms of their effectiveness,
along common law and civil law lines. Diversity is the consequence of
legal systems being matched (if imperfectly) over long period of time with
particular economic configurations. The processes by which legal forms
emerge in a way which is complementary to certain economic institutions,
but are then transplanted or diffused to alternative contexts, is imperfectly
understood. Given what we little we truly know of the legal origin effect,
it is premature to use it to construct a model of policy intervention.

32

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 NO. 07

REFERENCES
Aguilera, R. and Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2004) ‘Codes of Good Governance
Worldwide: What is the Trigger?’, Organization Studies, 25, 415-443.
Ahlering, B. and Deakin, S. (2007) ‘Labour Regulation, Corporate
Governance and Legal Origin: A Case of Institutional Complementarity?’,
Law & Society Review 41, 865-908.
Aoki, M. (2001) Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press).
Armour, J., Deakin, S., Lele, P. and Siems, M. (2008) ‘How Legal Rules
Evolve: Evidence from Panel Data’, paper presented to the Annual
Conference of the Law and Society Association, Berlin, July 2007;
forthcoming, CBR Working Paper series, 2008.
Armour J., Deakin S., Sarkar P., Siems M., and Singh A. (2007)
‘Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: an Empirical
Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis’, CBR Working Paper No. 358,
accessed at http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk on July 12 2008, and ECGI Law
Working
Paper
No.
2008/108,
accessed
at
http://www.ecgi.org/wp/wp.php?series=Law on July 12 2008.
Banton, M. (2004) ‘The Colonial Office, 1820-1955: Constantly the
Subject of Small Struggles’. In Hay, D. and Craven, P. (eds.) Masters,
Servants and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562-1955, Chapel
Hill, NC, University of North Carolina Press, pp. 251-302.
Beck T., Demirgüc-Kunt A. and Levine R. (2003) ‘Law and Finance: Why
Does Legal Origin Matter?’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 31, 653675.
Biernacki, R. (1995) The Fabrication of Labour: Britain and Germany,
1640-1914 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press).

2008]

LEGAL ORIGIN, JURIDICAL FORM & INDUSTRIALISATION

33

Botero J., Djankov S., La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F. and Shleifer A.
(2004) ‘The Regulation of Labor’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119,
1340-1382.
Braendle, U.C. (2006), ‘Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany:
on the Fallacy of LLSV’, German Working Papers in Law and Economics,
Vol
2006:
Article
18,
accessed
at
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2006/iss1/art18 on July 12 2008.
Chanock, M. (2004) ‘South Africa, 1841-1924: Race, Contract and
Coercion’. In Hay, D. and Craven, P. (eds.) Masters, Servants and
Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562-1955, Chapel Hill, NC,
University of North Carolina Press, pp. 338-364.
Coase, R.H. (1988) ‘The Nature of the Firm’, reprinted in Coase, R.H. The
Firm, the Market and the Law, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Cools, S. (2005) ‘The Real Difference in Corporate Law between the
United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers’, Delaware
Journal of Corporate Law, 30, 697-766.
Cottereau, A. (2000) ‘Industrial Tribunals and the Establishment of a Kind
of Common Law of Labour in Nineteenth Century France’. In Steinmetz,
W. (ed.) Private Law and Social Inequality in the Industrial Age.
Comparing Legal Cultures in Britain, France, Germany and the United
States, Oxford, OUP, pp. 203-226.
Davidov, G. (2006) ‘The Reports of My Death are Greatly Exaggerated:
“Employee” as a Viable (Though Over-used) Legal Concept’. In
Davidov, G. and Langille, B. (eds.) Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour
Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, pp. 133-152.
Davies, P. (1997) Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (6th ed.),
London, Sweet & Maxwell.
Deakin, S. (2006) ‘Capacitas: Contract Law and the Institutional
Foundations of a Market Economy’ European Review of Contract Law, 2:
317-341.

34

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 NO. 07

Deakin, S., Lele, P., Siems, M. (2007) ‘The Evolution of Labour Law:
Calibrating and Comparing Regulatory Regimes’, International Labour
Review, 146, 133-162.
Deakin, S. and Sarkar, P. (2008) ‘Assessing the Long-Run Economic
Impact of Labour Law Systems: A Theoretical Reappraisal and Analysis
of New Time Series Data’, Industrial Relations Journal, forthcoming.
Deakin, S. and Wilkinson, F. (2005) The Law of the Labour Market:
Industrialization, Employment and Legal Evolution, Oxford, OUP.
Didry, C. (2002) Naissance de la convention collective. Débats juridiques
et luttes sociales en France au début du XXe siècle, Paris, Éditions de
l’EHESS.
Djankov S., Glaeser E., La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F. and Shleifer A.
(2003a) ‘The New Comparative Economics’, Journal of Comparative
Economics, 31, 595-619.
Djankov S., Glaeser E., La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F. and Shleifer A.
(2003b) ‘Courts’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 453-517.
Djankov S., La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F. and Shleifer A. (2008), ‘The
Law and Economics of Self-Dealing’, forthcoming, Journal of Financial
Economics.
Djankov, S., Hart, O., McLeish, C., and Shleifer, A. (2006), ‘Debt
Enforcement Around the World’, ECGI Finance Working Paper No.
147/2007, accessed at http://www.ecgi.org/wp/wp.php?series=Finance on
July 12 2008.
Djankov, S., McLeish, C., and Shleifer, A. (2007) ‘Private Credit in 129
Countries’, Journal of Financial Economics, 84, 299-329.
Easterbrook, F. and Fischel, D. (1990) The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
Fagernäs, S., Sarkar, P. and Singh, A. (2007) ‘Legal Origin, Shareholder
Protection and the Stock Market: New Challenges from Time Series

2008]

LEGAL ORIGIN, JURIDICAL FORM & INDUSTRIALISATION

Analysis’,
CBR
Working
Paper
No.
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk on July 12 2008.

343,

accessed

35

at

Freedland, M. (2005) The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford: OUP).
Glaeser E. and Shleifer A. (2002) ‘Legal Origins’, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 117, 1193-1229.
Glenn, H.P. (2007) Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity
in Law, Oxford: OUP.
Hall, P. and Soskice, D. (2001) ‘An Introduction to Varieties of
Capitalism’. In Hall, P. and Soskice, D. Varieties of Capitalism: The
Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford, OUP, pp. 168.
Hannah, L. (1974) ‘Managerial Innovation and the Rise of the Large-Scale
Company in Interwar Britain’ Economic History Review (NS), 27, 252270
Hannah, L. (2007) ‘The “Divorce” of Ownership from Control from 1900
Onwards: Recalibrating Imagined Global Trends’ Business History, 49,
404-78.
Hansmann, H. and Kraakman, R. (2004) ‘What is Corporate Law?’, in
Kraakman, R., Davies, P., Hansmann, H., Hertig, G., Kanda, H., Hopt, K.
and Rock, E. (eds.) The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and
Functional Approach, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 1-19.
Harris, R. (2000) Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship and
Business Organization 1720-1844, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Hay, D. and Craven, P. (2004) ‘Introduction’, in Hay, D. and Craven, P.
(eds.) Masters, Servants and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 15621955, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, pp. 1-58.

36

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 NO. 07

Hay, D. and Craven, P. (eds.) (2004) Masters, Servants and Magistrates in
Britain and the Empire, Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina
Press.
Herrigel, G. (1996) Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German
Industrial Power, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Holbook-Jones, M. (1982) Supremacy and Subordination of Labour: The
Hierarchy of Work in the Early Labour Movement, London, Heinemann
Educational Books.
Kahn-Freund, O. (1978) ‘Blackstone’s Neglected Child: the Contract of
Employment’ Law Quarterly Review, 93, 508-528.
Kocka, J. (1980) ‘The Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise in
Germany’. In Chandler, A. and Daems, H. (eds.) Managerial Hierarchies:
Comparative Perspectives on the Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise,
Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, pp. 77-116.
Kostal, R. (1994) Law and English Railway Capitalism, Oxford,
Clarendon Press.
La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A. and Vishny R. (1998) ‘Law
and Finance’, Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1113-55.
La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., and Shleifer A. (2007) ‘The Economic
Consequences of Legal Origins’, Journal of Economic Literature, 46, 285332.
Le Roux, R. (2008) ‘The Evolution of the Contract of Employment in
South Africa’, mimeo, University of Cape Town.
Legrand, P. (1999) Fragments on Law-as-Culture, Deventer, Willink.
Lele, P. and Siems, M. (2007a) ‘Shareholder Protection: a Leximetric
Approach’, Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 7, 17-50.
Levine, R. (1997) ‘Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views
and Agenda’, Journal of Economic Literature, 35, 688-726.

2008]

LEGAL ORIGIN, JURIDICAL FORM & INDUSTRIALISATION

37

Lévy-Leboyer, M. (1980) ‘The Large Corporation in Modern France’, in
Chandler, A. and Daems, H. (eds.) Managerial Hierarchies: Comparative
Perspectives on the Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise, Cambridge,
MA, Harvard University Press, pp. 117-160.
Littler, C. (1982) The Development of the Labour Process in Capitalist
Societies: A Comparative Study of the Transformation of Work
Organisation in Britain, Japan and the United States, London, Heinemann
Educational Books.
Mahoney, P. (2001), ‘The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek
Might be Right’, Journal of Legal Studies, 30, 503-525.
Markesinis, B. (2003) Comparative Law in the Courtroom and Classroom,
Oxford, Hart Publishing.
Mattei, U. (1997) Comparative Law and Economics, Michigan, University
of Michigan Press.
North, D. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic
Performance, Cambridge, CUP.
Petit, H. and Sauze, D. (2006) ‘Une lecture historique du relation salariale
comme structure de répartition des aléas: en partant du travail de Salais’.
In Eymard-Duvernay, F. (ed.) L’économie des conventions: méthodes et
resultats. Tome II. Développements, Paris, La Découverte, pp. 303-316.
Pistor, K. (1999) ‘Codetermination in Germany: a Socio-Political Model
with Governance Externalities’. In Blair, M. and Roe, M. (eds.) Employees
and Corporate Governance, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, pp.
163-193.
Pistor, K. (2005), ‘Legal Ground Rules in Coordinated and Liberal Market
Economies’, ECGI Law Working Paper No 30/2005, accessed at
http://www.ecgi.org/wp/wp.php?series=Law on July 12 2008.

38

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 NO. 07

Pistor, K., Keinan, Y., Kleinheisterkamp, J., and West, M. (2003) ‘The
Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison’, University of
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, 23, 791-871.
Priest, G. (1977) ‘The Common Law Process and the Selection of
Efficient Rules’, Journal of Legal Studies, 6, 65-82.
Rajan, R. and Zingales, L. (2003) ‘The Great Reversals: the Politics of
Financial Development in the Twentieth Century’, Journal of Financial
Economics, 69, 5-50.
Roe, M. (2003), Political Determinants of Corporate Governance, Oxford,
OUP.
Roe, M. (2006) ‘Legal Origins, Politics and Modern Stock Markets’,
Harvard Law Review, 120, 460-527.
Sarkar, P. (2007) ‘Does Better Corporate Governance lead to Stock
Market Development and Capital Accumulation? A Case Study of India’,
paper presented to the conference on Corporate Governance in Emerging
Markets, Sabanci University, Istanbul, 15-17 November 2007, accessed at
http://www.emcgn2007.com/PRABIRJ%C4%B0TSARKAR.pdf on July
12 2008.
Siems, M. (2005), ‘Numerical Comparative Law – Do We Need Statistical
Evidence in Order to Reduce Complexity?’, Cardozo Journal of
International and Comparative Law, 13, 521-540.
Siems, M (2006) ‘Legal Adaptability in Elbonia’, International Journal of
Law in Context, 2, 393-408
Siems, M. (2007) ‘Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative Law’,
McGill Law Journal, 52, 55-81.
Siems, M. (2008) ‘Shareholder Protection Around the World (“Leximetric
II”)’, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, forthcoming.
Simitis, S. (2000) ‘The Case of the Employment Relationship: Elements of
a Comparison’. In Steinmetz, W. (ed.) Private Law and Social Inequality

2008]

LEGAL ORIGIN, JURIDICAL FORM & INDUSTRIALISATION

39

in the Industrial Age. Comparing Legal Cultures in Britain, France,
Germany and the United States, Oxford, OUP, pp. 181-202.
Simon, D. (1954) ‘Master and Servant’. In Saville, J. (ed.) Democracy and
the Labour Movement: Essays in Honour of Dona Torr, London,
Lawrence and Wishart, pp. 160-200.
Sims, V. (2002) ‘Good Faith in Contract Law: An Analysis of English
and German Contract Law’ Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge.
Spamann, H. (2006), ‘On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La
Porta et al.’s “Anti-Director Rights Index” under Consistent Coding’,
ECGI
Law
Working
Paper
No
67/2006,
accessed
at
http://www.ecgi.org/wp/wp.php?series=Law on July 12 2008.
Supiot, A. (1994) Critique du droit du travail, Paris, Presses Universitaires
de France.
Teubner, G. (2001), ‘Legal Irritants: How Unifying Law Ends Up in New
Divergences’. In Hall, P. and Soskice, D. (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism ,
Oxford, OUP, pp. 417-442.
Turner, M. (2004) ‘The British Caribbean, 1823-1838: the Transition from
Slave to Free Legal Status’. In Hay, D. and Craven, P. (eds.) Masters,
Servants and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562-1955, Chapel
Hill, NC, University of North Carolina Press, pp. 303-322.
Veneziani, B. (1986) ‘The Evolution of the Contract of Employment’. In
Hepple, B. (ed.) The Making of Labour Law in Europe, London, Mansell,
pp. 31-72.
World Bank (various years), Doing Business Report, accessed at
http://www.doingbusiness.org on July 12 2008.
Wrigley, E.A. (1988) Continuity, Chance and Change: The Character of
the Industrial Revolution in England, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press.

